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War’s over. Wormer dropped the big one.
What? “Over”?
Did you say “over”?
Nothing’s over until we decide it is!
Was it over when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor?
Hell, no!
- Germans?
- Forget it, he’s rolling.
And it ain’t over now.
‘Cause when the going gets tough . . .
(Patriotic instrumental music)
. . . the tough get going! Who’s with me?
Let’s go! Come on!1
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Introduction

FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly2 decision, many commentators predicted a similar fate for antitrust and other civil complainants as suffered by Mr. Blutarsky’s
famed (or infamous) Delta House. Considerable commentary quickly
sprang up regarding the Court’s supposed new and restrictive pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. These commentators insisted the standard meant likely—if not certain—doom for
countless antitrust and other lawsuits.3
But while Twombly seems to have shocked the legal profession, the
case actually did nothing to eviscerate, much less affect, Rule 8’s longstanding pleading pronouncement. To the contrary, it reaffirmed it.
For this reason, Twombly is remarkable only for its unremarkability—
an unremarkability that some seek to elevate to something it isn’t. Despite these plentiful views, Twombly’s language—coupled with the
Court’s pre-existing pleading principles—simply does not support the
restrictive interpretation that many insist.
Part I of this Article describes Rule 8’s origin and explains its intended application. Part II chronicles Rule 8’s history of restriction
and misapplication, and the Supreme Court’s contribution to ensuring Rule 8’s treatment in a manner consistent with its drafters’ intentions. Part III then examines Twombly, focusing on the Court’s
consideration, expression, and application of Rule 8’s pleading standard in more modern circumstances. Finally, Part IV explains how the
Twombly Court, in keeping with the Court’s longstanding goal of
preventing Rule 8’s misapplication, reaffirmed the intentions of Rule
8’s drafters and re-expressed Rule 8’s liberal pleading requirements.

I.

Origins of Rule 8

Rule 8 requires merely a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”4 Described as “a
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 879 (2008) (Twombly “put an end to notice pleading as it
has been understood in the seventy years since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 493–94
(2008) (“[R]ather than simply being required to state a claim, plaintiffs must now plead
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007))).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Harry Emmanuel Scozzaro, Jr., Notice Pleading Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Following Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.: Standing on the
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jewel in the crown of the Federal Rules,”5 Rule 8’s drafters intended it
to resolve past pleading abuses at common law and beyond.6
A. Common-Law Pleading and Its Complexity
Common-law pleading was originally oral, but this standard has
changed over the centuries towards a more detailed written requirement.7 As forms of action were developing and becoming far more
complex, the limitations of oral pleading presented considerable difficulties.8 A plaintiff had first to choose the right form of action, then
the plaintiff’s lawyer would exchange pleadings with the defense
counsel to generate a single issue for resolution.9 By proceeding
through numerous pleading stages—denial, avoidance, or demurrer—the parties would reduce the pleadings to a solitary dispositive
factual or legal issue.10 In this manner, common-law pleadings were
slow, expensive, and impractical.11 As a result, trial largely became an
afterthought to the pleading process.12
The gamesmanship that common-law pleading engendered required parties to employ highly stylized and technical pleading formuShoulders of Conley and Leatherman, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385, 416–17 (2002) (“[A]
pleading is to do little more than indicate the type of litigation that is involved.”).
5. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998).
6. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444 (1986) (“After extensive debate, the Rules were amended
in 1980 and 1983 to promote active case management through pretrial conferences that
could ‘formulate issues’ and eliminate ‘frivolous claims and defenses’ and control the conduct and content of discovery.”); see also Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81
TEX. L. REV. 551, 554 (2002) (Rule 8 was “designed to rectify the pleading abuses of the
past.”).
7. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 437; see also Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2
F.R.D. 456, 458 (1943) (“It is well known that the development of the jury system in England led to a substitution of formal written demands and answers in place of the earlier
simple oral statements of counsel in response to the questions of the court . . . .”); 5
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d
ed. 2004) (describing common law belief in objectives and functions of pleadings).
8. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 437.
9. Id.; see also Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading
Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 896 (2008) (“Common law practice centered on successive rounds of pleadings in the expectation that eventually the dispute would be reduced to a single issue of law or fact that would dispose of the case.”).
10. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 467 (6th ed. 2002) (describing how common law placed great importance on the pleadings).
11. See Fairman, supra note 6, at 554–55; see also Dace A. Caldwell, Comment, Civil
Procedure: Medical Malpractice Gets Eerie: The Erie Implications of a Heightened Pleading Burden
in Oklahoma, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 977, 998 (2004) (“Common law pleadings were notoriously
‘slow, expensive, and unworkable’ because litigants were forced through various stages of
pleading that courts ultimately relied upon to determine the outcome of the suit.”).
12. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 437.
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lations known as “color,” even for the simplest disputes.13 Color had
scant relation to the underlying facts and thus told a defendant little
about the plaintiff’s claim.14 But this was of no consequence, as defendants often prevailed after plaintiffs bungled the common law’s
hyper-technical pleading requirements.15
As pleading practice prospered, decisions on the merits became
more and more infrequent.16 What had begun as a seemingly workable pleading construct turned into a “wonderfully slow, expensive, and
unworkable” plan.17 Common-law pleading caused protracted disputes “by lawyers anxious to get admissions without committing themselves”18 and spawned wide-ranging dissatisfaction that ultimately led
to pleading reform.19
B. The Field Code—Not Such a Dream
In 1848, at the same time as similar reforms were occurring in
England,20 David Dudley Field began spearheading pleading reforms
in New York. In drafting the New York Code (“Field Code”), Field
endeavored to “eliminate decisions based on technicalities.”21 Instead
of stylized language, the Field Code required that complaints contain
a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary
and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to
enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended.”22
While reformers hailed Field’s efforts, the Code did not deliver as
expected.23 Instead, lawyers encountered a “quagmire of unresolvable
disputes as to whether allegations were ultimate fact, evidence, or conclusions—a categorization critical to whether the allegation was
proper under the [C]ode.”24 According to the Code, “[o]nly ultimate
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fairman, supra note 6, at 555 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 467 (1994)).
18. Id.; see also Clark, supra note 7, at 458.
19. Fairman, supra note 6, at 555.
20. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 438.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings, and Proceedings of the Courts of This State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521).
23. See Fairman, supra note 6, at 555.
24. Id.; see also Marcus, supra note 6, at 438 (The Field Code’s new pleading rules
“invited unresolvable disputes about whether certain assertions were allegations of ultimate
fact (proper), mere evidence (improper), or conclusions (improper).”).
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facts satisfied [its] pleading standard; evidentiary facts and conclusions within a pleading could not state a claim.”25 It was often difficult
for courts to distinguish between facts and conclusions because so
“many [legal] concepts, like agreement, ownership, and execution,
contain a mixture of historical fact and legal conclusion.”26 As a result,
an increasing number of disputes arose over “whether allegations
were evidence, facts, or conclusions of law.”27 The Field Code rapidly
devolved into a pleading system “that rivaled the waste, inefficiency,
and delay of the common-law practice it was designed to reform.”28
C. Finally, the 1938 Federal Rules
The origin of the 1938 Federal Rules dates back to the American
Bar Association’s twenty-ninth annual meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota
on August 29, 1906.29 Roscoe Pound, dean of the University of Nebraska College of Law, initiated matters with a blistering speech entitled The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice.30 The purpose of Pound’s remarks was to recount the “real and
serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for law which
exist[ed] in the United States . . . .”31 He noted multiple reasons for
his dissatisfaction with the American legal system, but he emphasized
his displeasure with “our American judicial organization and
procedure.”32
Pound’s comments were the catalyst of the 1938 Rules, but his
proffered changes were slow to be implemented.33 Only after count25. David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV.
390, 395 (1980).
26. Marcus, supra note 6, at 438.
27. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 999.
28. Fairman, supra note 6, at 555–56; see also CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 47, at 300–03 (2d ed. 1947) (observing the requirements for
pleading negligence under the Field Code were more demanding than under common
law); Marcus, supra note 6, at 438 (“Pleading decisions caused increasing difficulty for even
the most common claims. For example, the detail needed to allege negligence was regularly recalibrated. Such fencing among lawyers led to stagnation that interfered with resolution of disputes on their merits.”) (citation omitted).
29. Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 79, 93
(2006); see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 12–13, 55–65 (1906) (noting ABA concern over the federal judiciary’s organization and procedural rules).
30. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
in REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
395–417 (1906).
31. Id. at 396.
32. Id. at 397.
33. Walker, supra note 29, at 93, 94–95.
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less committees, protracted debates, and largely ineffective administrative efforts34 did Congress finally approve the 1934 Rules Enabling
Act.35 The Act, which was all but identical to an earlier ABA proposal,36 provided Congress the authority necessary to pass the 1938
Rules.37
In 1935, after a year of accomplishing very little, the Supreme
Court appointed an advisory committee to assist in developing a uniform federal procedure.38 The Committee’s reporter was Yale Law
School dean, Charles Clark.39 In addition to Clark and the Committee
Chairman—former Hoover administration attorney general and Coolidge administration solicitor general, William Mitchell—the Committee included eight practicing business attorneys and four senior
academics from prominent law schools.40
Following two years of meetings, “[the Committee] submitted its
final report to the Supreme Court on April 30, 1937.”41 The Court
adopted the final report and forwarded it to the Attorney General.42
Attorney General Homer Cummings then sent it to Congress,43 and
Congress approved the report by inaction,44 thus creating the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Clark described the Rules as “a significant
reform, involving the due subordination of civil procedure to the ends
of substantive justice . . . .”45
34. Id.
35. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 723b, 723c (1934)); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1015, 1096–97 (1982) (chronicling origin and enactment of the Rules Enabling
Act).
36. Burbank, supra note 35, at 1099.
37. See James S. Cochran, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1489 n.146 (1986) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created under the authority of [the Rules Enabling] Act . . . .”).
38. Walker, supra note 29, at 96; see also Order Appointment of Committee to Draft
Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935); Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 971–73 (1987) (“The composition of the Advisory Committee, appointed by the Supreme Court, reflected both the conservatives, and the professional, professorial liberals who had joined in supporting uniform federal rules.”).
39. Walker, supra note 29, at 96.
40. Id. at 97.
41. Id.
42. Orders Re Rules of Procedure, 302 U.S. 783, 783 (1937).
43. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645,
647 (1939).
44. Walker, supra note 29, at 98.
45. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938).

Winter 2010]

TWOMBLY & THE UNAFFECTED PLEADING STANDARD

577

Clark intended the Rules to serve four key functions: “(1) giving
notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) stating the facts each
party believes to exist; (3) narrowing the issues that must be litigated;
and (4) providing a means for speedy disposition of sham claims and
insubstantial defenses.”46 Rather than eliminate pleadings as initially
advocated by Clark,47 the Committee drafted Rule 8 such that it did
not incorporate such highly charged words as such “fact,” “conclusion,” and “cause of action.”48 The Committee settled on requiring a
party only to plead a “short and plain statement of a claim” entitling
the pleader to relief.49
To emphasize Rule 8’s simplicity, the Committee included a series of form complaints that satisfied the Rule’s standards.50 For example, Form 9 reversed decades of pleading-related litigation by finding
appropriate the allegation that “defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff.”51 Underlying this simplicity was Clark’s
aversion to the use of a “mere formal motion”52 to challenge the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings because it “really decides nothing of
substance.”53 Indeed, pleadings need “do little more than indicate
generally the type of litigation that is involved.”54
Clark and his fellow drafters’ generous pleading standard
stemmed from their belief that litigants should have their day in
court.55 This belief served as the basis for why they designed the Rules
to encourage determination on the merits, not on the pleadings:56
46. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1202.
47. Fairman, supra note 6, at 556; Marcus, supra note 6, at 439.
48. Fairman, supra note 6, at 556; Marcus, supra note 6, at 439.
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and
illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”).
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. app. of forms Form 9 (now Form 11); Marcus, supra note 6, at 439.
52. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (Judge Clark issued the
opinion, and indicated the plaintiff had “stated enough to withstand a mere formal motion, directed only to the face of the complaint, and that here is another instance of judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.”); Marcus, supra note 6, at 440.
53. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 54 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 1938).
54. 2A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.03 (2d ed. 1996); see
also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (“The new rules, however, restrict the
pleadings to the task of general notice-giving . . . .”).
55. Fairman, supra note 6, at 557.
56. See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical
Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1127–28 (1994)
(explaining that drafters sought to resolve disputes by elevating substance over form); Jack
B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
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The notice in mind is rather that of the general nature of the case
and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to
differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the opponent
of the affair or transaction to be litigated—but not of details which
he should ascertain for himself in preparing his defense—and to
tell the court of the broad outlines of the case.57

Since pleadings were intended primarily to provide notice to litigants, the drafters included additional methods for addressing such
functions as fact-finding and issue narrowing.58 The Rules’ expanded
discovery methods allowed litigants to get to the merits of a case in
several ways, such as by developing facts through discovery,59 narrowing issues through discovery or partial summary judgment,60 and eliminating meritless claims through summary judgment.61 When
considered alongside the other Rules, it becomes evident that Rule 8’s
notice function “operates as a keystone to an entire procedural
system . . . .”62

II.

Rule 8’s Misapplication and the Return to Sensibility

A. Reaffirming Rule 8’s Liberal Application
Rule 8 was not universally accepted.63 The question was whether
the requirement that a pleader allege his or her entitlement to relief
also meant he or she must allege a prima facie case.64 Believing so, the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference adopted a resolution supporting an
amendment to Rule 8(a)(2) to require a pleader’s short, plain statement also to “contain the facts constituting a cause of action.”65 The
primary decision fueling this effort was now-Judge Clark’s own opinion in Dioguardi v. Durning.66
Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988) (noting that drafters intended Rules to
allow litigants to resolve disputes based on facts not form).
57. Clark, supra note 7, at 460–61.
58. Fairman, supra note 6, at 557.
59. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37.
60. See id.; Fed R. Civ. P. 56.
61. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56.
62. Fairman, supra note 6, at 556–57; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1202
(“The only function left to be performed by the pleadings alone is that of notice.”).
63. See WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 476 (positing that lawyers skilled in old pleading
style may have fueled criticism of Rule 8); Fairman, supra note 6, at 558.
64. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1202 (discussing difficulty in establishing
what constituted a claim showing an entitlement to relief).
65. Claim or Cause of Action—A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253–54 (1953) (committee
reports that there should “be a pleading requirement in civil actions in the Federal Courts
that a complaint must allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action”).
66. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
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Dioguardi involved a payment dispute that resulted in the Collector of Customs’ delay in releasing John Dioguardi’s medicinal tonics.67 After holding Dioguardi’s tonics for a year, the Collector finally
sold them at auction.68 Dioguardi filed a pro se complaint alleging that
the Collector had “sold [his] merchandise to another bidder with [Dioguardi’s] price of $110, and not of [the Collector’s] price of $120,”69
and “that three weeks before the sale, two cases, of 19 bottles each
case, disappeared.”70
The United States moved to dismiss Dioguardi’s complaint for
failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.71 Following
the district court’s order granting Dioguardi leave to amend, he filed
a second complaint conveying “obviously heightened conviction that
he was being unjustly treated[,]”72 but the district court again dismissed it.73 On appeal, Judge Clark, writing for the Second Circuit,
reversed: “[H]owever inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has
disclosed his claims that the collector has converted or otherwise done
away with two of his cases of medicinal tonics and has sold the rest in a
manner incompatible with the public auction . . . .”74 Judge Clark added that “[u]nder the new rules of civil procedure, there is no pleading requirement of stating ‘facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action,’ but only that there be ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .’”75
Given Rule 8’s purpose, the Second Circuit’s decision stood to
reason. Had the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, Dioguardi never would have had the chance to demonstrate his claim’s
merits, which may well have proven true. Because the United States
moved to dismiss rather than for summary judgment, the district
court’s decision short-circuited any possibility of honest factual resolution. But the Second Circuit’s reversal eventually generated tremendous controversy because on remand Dioguardi failed to prove his
claim, and the district court entered judgment for the United States.76
Given the Second Circuit’s affirmance, Dioguardi became a flashpoint
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 774–75.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Dioguardi v. Durning, 151 F.2d 501, 501–02 (2d Cir. 1945).
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for critics who supported strict pleading rules as a way to conserve
judicial resources.77
Nevertheless, after Dioguardi the Federal Rules Advisory Committee rejected the Ninth Circuit’s proposed amendment and instead
drafted an extensive note rebuffing Rule 8’s criticism.78 The Committee’s note explained that, contrary to any criticism, “Rule 8 envisages a
statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the
claim . . . .”79 The Committee further rejected the idea that Dioguardi
had approved filing a complaint alleging insufficient information to
disclose a basis for relief.80 Instead, the Committee indicated that Dioguardi’s amended complaint stated sufficient facts, which the court
properly construed as sufficient, as pleaded, to sustain his cause of
action.81 As a result—and contrary to critics’ insistence—the Committee declared that Rule 8 required no amendment:
[T]he rule adequately sets forth the characteristics of good pleading; does away with the confusion resulting from the use of “facts”
and “causes of action”; and requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to
it.82

In this manner, the Committee reaffirmed its goal of Rule 8’s liberal application and articulated the level of detail (or not) necessary
for pleading a sustainable complaint.
B. Reaffirmation at the Highest Level
Although the Supreme Court never adopted the Committee’s
proposed final report,83 in 1957 the Court quelled any uncertainty
regarding Rule 8’s liberal application when it decided Conley v.
Gibson.84
Conley involved a class-action lawsuit brought by African-American
railway workers against their union because their union had allegedly
breached its duty to represent them and other members fairly.85 According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the railroad claimed to abolish
77.
78.
79.
app. F
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Fairman, supra note 6, at 559.
Id. at 560.
12A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: APPENDICES,
(2009).
Fairman, supra note 6, at 560 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, at app. F).
Id.
Id. (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, at app. F).
Id.
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Id. at 42.
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forty-five African-American union members’ jobs, only to refill them
with white workers.86 Despite the plaintiffs’ insistence, the union had
failed to protect them against the railroad’s discrimination or to provide them protection comparable to the union’s white members.87
Among other responses to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the union moved
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because it did not describe specific facts of the union’s alleged discrimination.88 The district court granted the union’s motion,
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.89
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, explaining that the
plaintiffs’ complaint complied with Rule 8’s liberal pleading standard.90 The Court first declared that a court cannot dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”91 And because the allegations in the
plaintiffs’ complaint, if true, would have constituted a breach of the
union’s duty of fair representation owed to its members, the Court
ruled that the district court should not have dismissed the
complaint.92
The Court next reiterated the factual detail necessary to plead a
cause of action under Rule 8:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the
contrary, all the Rules require is “a short and plain statement of the
claim” that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.93

The Court noted that the Rules’ illustrative forms easily demonstrate this liberal standard and that “simplified ‘notice pleading’ is
made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other
pretrial procedures established by the Rules . . . .”94 The Court rejected the notion that the Rules considered pleading as a skillful game
where the slightest mistake could doom a plaintiff’s complaint and
instead embraced Rule 8’s approach to facilitate decisions on the mer86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 43.
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

47.
44.
48.
45–46.
46.
47.
47–48.
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its.95 With the Court’s holding, the common law and Field Code’s rigorous symmetry and fact-intensive requirements became a thing of the
past—or so it seemed.
C. The Expansion of Rule 9’s Particularity Requirement and the
Reaffirmation of Rule 8’s Forgiving Standard
Rule 8 does not contemplate situations requiring enhanced
pleading particularity because that is addressed by Rule 9, which
states, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”96 This heightened pleading requirement is
based on the belief that allegations of fraud and moral turpitude can
cause inordinate damage to a defendant’s reputation, so plaintiffs
should not be permitted to plead such allegations generally. Rather,
plaintiffs must describe specific facts constituting a defendant’s alleged fraud.97
Despite Conley’s apparent clarity, lower courts began raising the
pleadings bar by imposing Rule 9’s heightened standard on cases involving securities fraud, conspiracy, and civil rights violations.98 For
instance, in Elliot v. Perez,99 the Fifth Circuit adopted a heightened
pleading standard for cases involving government actors serving in
their individual capacity, reasoning that immunity from liability also
provided protection against burdensome discovery and litigation.100
To ensure this protection, the Fifth Circuit required a plaintiff’s complaint to “state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the
claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot
successfully maintain the defense of immunity.”101 The Fifth Circuit
extended this holding in Palmer v. City of San Antonio102 where it explained that its heightened pleading standard applied not only to
95. Id. at 48.
96. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Despite Rule 9’s application to situations involving “mistake,”
scant cases exist invoking this basis.
97. See Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting Rule 9(b) evolves
from interest in protecting defendants from harm to reputation or goodwill when charged
with serious misconduct); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 288 (3d
ed. 1999) (explaining common law disfavored fraud claims because they involved allegations of immorality).
98. Marcus, supra note 6, at 447.
99. Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. See id. at 1479.
101. Id. at 1473.
102. Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1987).
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cases involving immunity to public officials but to all civil rights cases
filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.103
The Supreme Court seemed to have the Fifth Circuit’s retrenchment in mind when it accepted Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit.104 Leatherman involved two episodes of
police misconduct in executing search warrants.105 In the first case,
Charlene Leatherman and her son Travis were driving in Fort Worth,
Texas when they were stopped by police.106 Officers surrounded
Leatherman’s vehicle and informed her that her residence was being
searched.107 Leatherman and Travis returned home to find that officers had ruthlessly shot and killed their two dogs, Shakespeare and
Ninja.108 Although the search of the home yielded absolutely nothing
inculpatory, officers stood on the Leatherman’s front lawn “for over
an hour, drinking, smoking, talking, and laughing, apparently celebrating their seemingly unbridled power.”109
In the second incident, police obtained a warrant to search Gerald Andert’s home after detecting odors associated with the manufacture of amphetamines.110 At the time of the search, Andert was a sixtyfour-year-old grandfather mourning his wife’s death from cancer.111
Officers burst into his home without knocking or otherwise announcing themselves.112 And although Andert did nothing to provoke the
officers, they pushed him backwards and issued two blows to his head
with a club.113 The officers also forced Andert’s family, who remained
unaware of the officers’ identity, to lie face down on the floor and
subjected them to a torrent of threats and obscenities.114 After an extensive yet completely fruitless hour-and-a-half search, officers left the
residence.115
103. Id. at 516–17.
104. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993).
105. Id. at 164–65.
106. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 954
F.2d 1054, 1055 (5th Cir. 1992).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1055–56.
109. Id. at 1056.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The Leatherman and Andert plaintiffs sued several municipalities, alleging failure to train officers properly in executing search warrants and confronting dogs.116 Three defendants argued the
plaintiffs’ complaint failed to plead facts adequately under the Fifth
Circuit’s heightened pleading standard as expressed in Elliot and
Palmer, and the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against all
defendants.117
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs did not argue that
their complaints met the circuit’s heightened standard; rather, they
encouraged the court to abolish it.118 Constrained by Elliot and Palmer,
and considering that even the plaintiffs admitted that their complaint
fell short of this standard, the Fifth Circuit declined:
[W]e, as a panel of this court, must politely decline [plaintiffs’]
invitation to reexamine the wisdom of this circuit’s heightened
pleading requirement. Until such a time as the en banc court sees
fit to reconsider Elliott or, more specifically, Palmer, and in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision undermining our
settled precedent, I find myself constrained to obey the command
of the heightened pleading requirement.119

The Supreme Court accepted the Fifth Circuit’s invitation to consider
its heightened pleading standard. In a five-page opinion, the Court
unanimously struck down the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive interpretation,
explaining that “it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading
standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”120 The Court
added that the Rules required more particularized pleading in two
discrete instances—fraud and mistake—and that Rule 8(a)(2) required merely that a complaint include “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”121 Accordingly, the Court reversed the order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint,
with Chief Justice Rehnquist adding this final admonition:
[I]f Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained
by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment, federal
courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1058.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1061 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
120. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
121. Id.
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discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than
later.122

The Court’s unequivocal reaffirmation seemed to suggest an end
to lower courts’ heightened-pleading efforts, but more challenges lay
ahead.
D. Déjà Vu All Over Again
Since history tends to repeat itself, perhaps it is not surprising
that lower courts continued applying heightened pleading standards
even after Leatherman.123 This intransigence caused the Supreme
Court—again—to reaffirm Rule 8’s liberal application unanimously in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.124
Swierkiewicz was an employment case involving Akos Swierkiewicz,
a fifty-three-year-old Hungarian native.125 Swierkiewicz was a senior
vice president and chief underwriting officer for Sorema N.A., a reinsurance company.126 After the company demoted and eventually fired
him, Swierkiewicz sued, alleging national origin and age
discrimination.127
The district court dismissed Swierkiewicz’s complaint, believing
he “ha[d] not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he ha[d]
not adequately alleged circumstances that support[ed] an inference
of discrimination.”128 In a four-page, unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, insisting, “[i]t is well settled in this
Circuit that a complaint consisting of nothing more than naked assertions, and setting forth no facts upon which a court could find a violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to state a claim under Rule
122. Id. at 168–69.
123. See, e.g., Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 424–25 (6th Cir. 2001) (heightened
pleading standard applied in qualified immunity case); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d
1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998) (heightened pleading standard applied in immunity case);
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“When a public official
pleads the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in his answer, the district court may,
on the official’s motion or on its own, require the plaintiff to reply to that defense in
detail.”); Edgington v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 779 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (heightened pleading standard applied in case against government officials for money damages);
Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey, 905 F.3d 754, 764 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
124. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
125. Id. at 508.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 509.
128. Id.
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12(b)(6).”129 The Supreme Court accepted Swierkiewicz’s request to
elucidate Rule 8’s requirements.130
Consistent with Conley and Leatherman, the Court reversed the Circuit Court’s dismissal,131 holding that employment discrimination
complaints need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie
claim; rather, these complaints must merely allege a “short and plain
statement of the claim . . . .”132 The Court added that while its holding
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green133 required a private, non-class
plaintiff to prove his or her discrimination case by a preponderance of
the evidence,134 this evidentiary burden did not create a pleading standard.135 Having already “rejected the argument that a Title VII complaint requires greater ‘particularity,’ because greater particularity
would ‘too narrowly constric[t] the role of the pleadings,’”136 the
Court reiterated that “the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency
of a complaint apply.”137
The Court went further to add that “under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case because the McDonnell Douglas framework does
not apply in every employment discrimination case.”138 For example,
“if a plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he
[or she] may prevail without proving all the elements of a prima facie
case.”139 But under the Second Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff lacking direct evidence of discrimination when filing
his or her complaint would nevertheless have to plead a prima facie
case of discrimination, even though discovery might uncover direct
129. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 5 Fed. App’x 63, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martin
v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1978)).
130. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509–10.
131. Id. at 515.
132. Id. at 508 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
133. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas involved a plaintiff’s civil-rights claim
against his employer, alleging his employer’s refusal to rehire him as an aircraft mechanic
because of his race and involvement in the civil rights movement. The Court sustained
plaintiff’s complaint, explaining that an EEOC finding of reasonable cause was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to plaintiff’s civil-rights claim.
134. Id. at 802.
135. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
136. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11
(1976)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)) (“The
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination.”).

Winter 2010]

TWOMBLY & THE UNAFFECTED PLEADING STANDARD

587

evidence.140 “It thus seem[ed] incongruous,” the Court believed, “to
require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead
more facts than he [or she] may ultimately need to prove to succeed
on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered.”141
But the Court’s ruling was not grounded so much in substantive
employment-law doctrine as it was in the Federal Rules. Revisiting
Leatherman, the Court re-emphasized that Rule 8’s exceptions appear
in Rule 9(b): “The Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question
of the need for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but
do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983.”142
Just as Rule 9(b) makes no mention of municipal liability, neither
does it refer to employment discrimination. As such, employment
complaints, like most others, “must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).”143 If a defendant believes a complaint fails to
provide sufficient notice, then the defendant can move for a more
definite statement under Rule 12(e),144 while the court can deal with
meritless claims through Rule 56’s summary-judgment mechanism.145
And continually mindful that greater specificity for pleading particular claims must come through amending the Federal Rules—not by
judicial intervention—the Court stated, “[t]he liberal notice pleading
of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system,
which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”146
Considering Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz together, then,
adduces the following observations.147 First, a plaintiff’s complaint
serves a notice function and informs the defendant of the claim and
its basis.148 Factual detail is not necessary at the pleading stage149 be140. Id.
141. Id. at 511–12.
142. Id. at 513 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 514.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Spencer, supra note 3, at 438–39.
148. Id.; see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (“Under Rule 8(a), applicable
to ordinary civil proceedings, a complaint need only provide ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957))).
149. Spencer, supra note 3, at 439; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell,
480 U.S. 557, 568 n.15 (1987) (“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent
had no duty to set out all of the relevant facts in his complaint.”); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47
(“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
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cause the Rules provide later opportunities to develop these facts.150
Next, dismissal is inappropriate when it remains possible for a plaintiff
to adduce facts supporting his or her claim.151 Finally, the pretrial
process, which includes broad discovery,152 is the appropriate mechanism for weeding out improper or unmeritorious claims.153
Then, along came Twombly.

III.

Understanding Twombly

As of March 2008, lower courts had cited Twombly more than
9400 times,154 many concluding that Twombly had established a new
pleading standard under Rule 8.155 But examining Twombly actually
indicates nothing of the sort.
facts upon which he bases his claim.”); see also Spencer, supra note 3, at 438 (“[F]actual
detail was unnecessary at the pleading stage . . . .”).
150. Spencer, supra note 3, at 439; see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (“[S]implified ‘notice pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim
and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”); Spencer, supra
note 3, at 438 (“[S]ubsequent phases of the litigation would elicit such details and frame
the issues in the case.”).
151. Spencer, supra note 3, at 439; see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (“[A] complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (“A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.”) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46); Spencer, supra
note 3, at 438–39 (“[O]nly certainty of the absence of a claim warranted dismissal; when
one could say that it remained possible for the plaintiff to adduce facts that could prove
liability, dismissal was inappropriate.”) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46).
152. Spencer, supra note 3, at 439; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)
superseded in part by statute, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (“We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the
facts underlying his opponent’s case.”) (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 3, at 439
(“[T]he pleadings were not the proper vehicle for screening out unmeritorious claims.
Rather, other pretrial procedures—namely broad discovery and summary judgment—were
the proper vehicles for ferreting out claims lacking merit.”) (citations omitted).
153. Spencer, supra note 3, at 439; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
514 (2001) (“[C]laims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under
Rule 56.”); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993). (“[F]ederal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment
and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.”).
154. Ward, supra note 9, at 893.
155. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The Court
replaced the Conley standard with a new standard in Twombly, which prescribed a new inquiry for [courts] to use in reviewing a dismissal: whether the complaint contains enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”) (quoting The Ridge at Red
Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed to open up
competition in the local telephone markets by requiring local-exchange carriers (“ILECs”), like the Twombly defendants, to facilitate
the entry of new competitors.156 The Act requires ILECs to sell access
to parts of their networks at wholesale rates, thereby allowing competing-local-exchange carriers (“CLECs”) to circumvent the high cost of
building their own infrastructure.157
Twombly involved a group of purchasers of local telephone or
high-speed internet services who filed a class-action antitrust lawsuit
against four ILECs who “together controlled over ninety percent of
the market for local telephone and high-speed internet services in the
continental United States.”158 Plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs had
thwarted the CLECs’ efforts to enter the ILECs’ local-service markets
by conspiring “(1) to collectively keep CLECs from successfully entering [the ILECs’] markets, and (2) to refrain from attempting to enter
each other’s markets as CLECs.”159 Plaintiffs added that defendants’
marks omitted); VanZandt v. Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 276 Fed. App’x 843, 846 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“In order for a complaint to satisfy this new standard, a plaintiff must do more
than generally allege a wide swath of conduct.”); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d
Cir. 2008) (“We need not locate the outer bounds of Twombly’s new standard for assessing
pleadings under Rule 8(a) here, because no amplification was necessary in this case.”);
McKinley v. Omaha Police Dep’t, No. 8:09CV222, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71993, at *2 (D.
Neb. Aug. 14, 2009) (describing Twombly as “setting [a] new standard for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted”); Smith v. McNeil, No. 4:08-CV-321, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69802, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2009) (“The Supreme Court recently expressed a new standard in [Twombly].”); Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:08CV447, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68962, at *39 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009) (“Twombly abrogated the no set of facts
standard set forth in Conley for construing Rule 8, and heralded a new standard for resolving motions to dismiss, which was based on the plausibility of a plaintiff’s claims.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mills v. Williams, No. 2:09CV00045, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68823, at *3 (E.D. Ark. July 15, 2009) (“Twombly . . . heralded a new standard for resolving
motions to dismiss, which was based on the ‘plausibility’ of a plaintiff’s claims.”); United
States v. Goertz, No. A-09-CV-179, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49213, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 11,
2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court made it plain that this new standard applies to all cases.”);
Tustin v. Jayaraj, No. 3:08-cv-01034, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46451, at *11 (D. Conn. June 2,
2009) ([T]he Supreme Court announced the new standard in . . . Twombly.“); Evans v.
Maui Cup-Letica Corp., No. 3:CV-07-01446, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32435, at *8 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 16, 2009) (”The Court retired this ‘no set of facts’ language in favor of a new standard
. . . .“); Rivera v. Hosp. Episcopal Cristo Redentor, 613 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196 (D.P.R. 2009)
(”[T]he new standard under Twombly is that a claim for relief must contain allegations that
are plausible on its face.“) (internal quotation marks omitted); Yai v. Progressive Bayside
Ins. Co., No. 1:08-CV-1369, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10504, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2009)
(describing ”the new standards set forth in Twombly“).
156. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated,
425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 176.
159. Id. at 182.
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refusal to compete as CLECs in each others’ territories constituted
parallel conduct that plaintiffs’ considered probative of a conspiracy,
and that competition would have occurred had defendants not conspired to avoid it.160
The district court read the plaintiffs’ complaint to allege merely
conscious parallelism:
[W]hile plaintiffs may allege a conspiracy by citing instances of parallel business behavior that suggest an agreement, courts must be
cognizant of the fact that, while “[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the
traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy[, . . .] ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.” . . . [P]arallel action is a common and often legitimate
phenomenon, because similar market actors with similar information and economic interests will often reach the same business
decisions.161

Based on the plaintiffs’ allegations of conscious parallelism, the
district court dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.162 The court explained that
“Plaintiffs ha[d] . . . not alleged facts that suggest[ed] that refraining
from competing in other territories as CLECs was contrary to defendants’ apparent economic interests, and consequently ha[d] not raised
an inference that their actions were the result of a conspiracy.”163
But the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
that the district court had applied an unfairly restrictive pleading standard.164 Rightly observing that no heightened pleading standard applies in antitrust cases,165 the Second Circuit believed that plaintiffs’
160. Id. at 178.
161. Id. at 179.
162. Id. at 188.
163. Id.
164. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 119 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
165. Id. at 108; see also George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551, 553–54 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting argument that “antitrust
claims, because of their complexity, must be pleaded with greater specificity than other
claims”); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322–23 (2d Cir. 1957) (“[M]any defense
lawyers have strongly advocated more particularized pleading in this area of litigation. . . .
But it is quite clear that the federal rules contain no special exceptions for antitrust
cases.”). Some courts have even explained that antitrust cases are less suitable candidates
for dismissal at the pleading stage than other kinds of litigation because evidence of the
claimed illegality frequently rests in defendants’ exclusive control. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (“[I]n antitrust cases, where ‘the proof is
largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,’ dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff
ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.”) (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)).
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allegations of solely conscious parallelism provided more than “a bare
bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws.”166
The court expressed that to survive a motion to dismiss an antitrust case, the claimant “must allege only the existence of a conspiracy
and a sufficient supporting factual predicate on which that allegation
is based,”167 adding that “pleading of facts indicating parallel conduct
by the defendants can suffice to state a plausible claim of conspiracy.”168 Believing it reasonable to infer collusion from the plaintiffs’
conscious parallelism allegations, the court invoked Conley as its basis
for concluding that plaintiffs’ “allegations [were] sufficient ‘to give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim [was] and the grounds
upon which it rest[ed] . . . .’”169
Not dissimilar from its motivation for considering the lower
courts’ rulings in Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Twombly “to address the proper standard
for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel
conduct . . . .”170 The Court first explained that conscious parallelism
without more “falls short of ‘conclusively establish[ing] an agreement
or . . . itself constitut[ing] a Sherman Act offense,’”171 because such
conduct is no less consistent “with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”172 Justice Souter, writing for the Court, then
dove directly into considering plaintiffs’ complaint against Conley’s
pleading standard.
The Court began its analysis by repeating Conley’s instruction that
not only does Rule 8(a)(2) require a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” but this statement
must also “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.”173 These “grounds,” explained the
Court, require more than “mere labels and conclusions”;174 they
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”175
166. Twombly, 425 F.3d at 109 (quoting Heart Disease Research Found. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972)).
167. Id. at 114.
168. Id. (citing Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1957)).
169. Id. at 118–19 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
170. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 554.
173. Id. at 555 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Applying these standards to the plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint, the
Court held that properly pleading such a complaint requires including enough factual allegations to suggest the defendants made an illegal agreement.176 The Court added that this plausibility (or
believability) at the pleadings “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement . . . even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the
facts is improbable . . . .”177 Accordingly, the Court directed that the
plaintiffs’ allegations of conscious parallelism and conspiracy as the
grounds upon which the plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint rested were insufficient to suggest conspiracy with any believability,178 and instead
the plaintiffs’ complaint needed facts raising at least “a suggestion of a
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as
well be independent action.”179
After so ruling, the Court went to great lengths to explain that it
did not intend to upset its historical interpretation and application of
Rule 8. “The need at the pleading stage,” the Court instructed, “for
allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the
‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’”180 Plaintiffs’ allegations of conscious parallelism
without “further circumstances pointing toward a meeting of the
minds”181 (i.e., the grounds upon which such an allegation rested182)
failed to comply with Rule 8’s standard.
Turning next to Conley’s “no set of facts” language, the Court
noted a literal reading of this language would allow a court to sustain
a complaint based on “wholly conclusory statement . . . .”183 Believing
this literal reading and extension was inconsistent with Rule 8’s historical application, the Court—while not upending Rule 8’s fact-pleading
requirement—retired Conley’s “no set of facts” phrase, describing it as
an “incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard:
once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by show176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 556–57.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id.
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
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ing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”184
The Court explained that its adoption of this phrase in Conley was intended to “describe[ ] the breadth of opportunity to prove what an
adequate complaint claims, not [to establish] the minimum standard
of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”185
The Court believed nothing contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly, realistically, or believably suggested a conspiracy.186
Therefore, it reversed the Second Circuit’s order sustaining plaintiffs’
complaint.187 Immediately before so ruling, the Court again emphasized that it did not intend to raise Rule 8’s historical notice-pleading
standard: “[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be
dismissed.”188
The Court further emphasized that any such changes rested
solely in the congressional domain and that until Congress initiates a
change, Rule 9’s heightened pleading requirements apply in extremely narrow circumstances:
In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any “heightened”
pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be accomplished “‘by the
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” On certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of
abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual allegations with
greater particularity than Rule 8 requires. Here, our concern is not
that the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently “particular[ized]”; rather, the complaint warranted dismissal because it
failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.189

The reason for the Court’s extensive pacifying language was its
critical evaluation of Conley’s interpretation and application of Rule 8.
On this basis, some judges and commentators have concluded that
because the Court used the adjective “plausible,” which simply meaning “having an appearance of truth or reason,”190 when describing the
grounds upon which a complaint’s factual allegations must rest,
Twombly spawned a new and more restrictive pleading standard. But
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. 566.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id. at 569 n.14 (citations omitted).
THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1018 (1982).
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the rumors of the death of Rule 8’s age-old pleading standard have
been greatly exaggerated.191

IV.

Twombly Did Not Change Rule 8’s Historical Pleading
Standard

The Twombly Court’s instruction that “we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face,”192 should have surprised no one,
as it mirrored the Court’s longstanding precedent refusing to impose
heightened pleading requirements extending beyond simple notice
pleading. This directive makes perfect sense because insisting on anything more at the pleading stage requires a plaintiff to prove his or
her case to a summary-judgment standard absent discovery—nearly
always an impossible task—which of course is why such allegations are
not required.
The Court instructed that a complaint’s factual allegations must
make some practical sense. But this believability requirement has always been implicit in and an integral part of Rule 8, and the Twombly
Court merely expressed what has always been the case. Indeed, even
the Second Circuit, when sustaining the plaintiffs’ complaint, instructed that the complaint must “include conspiracy among the
realm of plausible possibilities,”193 believing like the Court that this
plausibility consideration did not raise plaintiffs’ pleading requirement. That the Court’s ultimate opinion differed from the Second
Circuit’s as to whether plaintiffs’ parallel-conduct allegations actually
constituted the requisite short-and-plain statement can hardly be taken
as suggesting that the Court invoked some sort of elevated pleading
standard, especially when the Court insisted that it had not.
Indeed, to suppress any confusion, less than two weeks after
Twombly, the Court repeated that Rule 8(a)(2)’s simple short-andplain-statement requirement provides central guidance for federal
courts. In Erickson v. Pardus,194 a prisoner filed a pro se Section 1983
191. See MARK TWAIN, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF MARK TWAIN: A BOOK OF QUOTATIONS
46 (Paul Negri ed., 1999) (“The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”).
192. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
193. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
194. 551 U.S. 89 (2007). After Erickson, the Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07–1015
U.S. 1 (May 18, 2009), where the Court dismissed a complaint alleging high-level government officials had “adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected [him] to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.” Id. at 1. But
while the Iqbal Court drew heavily on Twombly as its basis for dismissal, Iqbal is meaningful
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action alleging that prison medical officials had diagnosed him as requiring treatment for hepatitis C but had discontinued his treatment
because they suspected he had taken illicit drugs.195 The prisoner
claimed he was suffering liver damage due to his untreated disease,
and that its progression could cause irreversible liver damage and possibly death.196 The prisoner’s complaint added that he was in imminent danger as hepatitis C had already killed other inmates.197
Although the prisoner’s complaint alleged the defendants’ conduct
had violated his Eighth Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing his complaint, explaining
he had made “only conclusory allegations to the effect that he ha[d]
suffered a cognizable independent harm . . . .”198
This dismissal visibly troubled the Court. “The holding,” the
Court explained, “departs in so stark a manner from the pleading
standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that we
grant review.”199 The Court ruled that the lower courts had erred by
concluding the prisoner’s allegations of a cognizable independent
harm were “too conclusory,”200 and in doing so invoked Twombly and
its reiteration of Rule 8(a)(2)’s core pleading requirement:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only
“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” In addition, when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.201

The Court even highlighted Rule 8(f)’s mandate that “[a]ll
pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice” and concluded that “[t]he case cannot . . . be dismissed on the ground that
petitioner’s allegations of harm were too conclusory to put these matters in issue.”202
Thus, within two weeks after Twombly, the Court reaffirmed
Twombly’s simple message and again validated what federal courts
insofar as it confirms, like Erickson, that Twombly’s Rule 8 affirmation concerns all types of
litigation not just antitrust claims. Restriction would have made little sense as the Federal
Rules (including Rule 8) necessarily apply to all civil litigation.
195. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 91.
196. Id. at 92.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. at 90.
200. Id. at 93.
201. Id. at 93–94 (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 94 (citation omitted).
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have held for decades: Our civil pleading system, as encompassed in
Rule 8(a)(2), has always required and still requires a short-and-plain
statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.203 To
this end, multiple lower courts have cited Twombly as a basis for sustaining complaints pleaded consistent with this venerable standard.204
And concomitantly, where complaints lack minimal facts, courts have
continued granting motions to dismiss after invoking Twombly.205 For
as Justice Souter even more recently explained in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,206
where the very believability of a complaint’s allegations are suspect,
such as where plaintiff alleges “claims about little green men, or the
plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel,”207 the
complaint continues—as always—to fall short of satisfying Rule 8’s liberal standard.
203. Id. at 93.
204. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3rd Cir. 2008)
(Twombly does not require “detailed factual allegations” or “pleading with particularity”;
rather, it “requires only a short and plain statement that the pleader is entitled to relief in
order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is the grounds upon which it
rests.”); Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.
2007) (“[T]aking Erickson and Twombly together, we understand the Court to be saying only
at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does
not provide the type of notice of the claim that the defendant is entitled to under Rule
8.”); In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 566 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370 (M.D. Pa.
2008) (“[T]he claims presented need not be alleged with particularity, but there must be
sufficient factual averments that place the defendants on notice of the bases for the claims;
and plaintiff’s entitlement to relief on the bases for the claim presented against a particular defendant must be plausible.”); Hiltabidel v. Herald Standard Newspaper, No. 2:08-cv409, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49668, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2008) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss because complaint’s allegations rendered plaintiff’s claims plausible);
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Twombly as
basis for denying defendants’ motion to dismiss because federal courts should evaluate
such motions based on reasonable, pre-discovery inferences drawn from the facts alleged
and in the proper context, such as where antitrust plaintiffs can only necessarily know so
much before committing to take full discovery, including depositions); Walker v. S.W.I.F.T.
SCRL, 491 F. Supp. 2d 781, 788 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (noting Twombly’s confirmation that a
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” and finding the complaint sufficient
under Rule 8(a)(2) to put defendant on notice and establish plaintiff’s standing); Castaneda v. City of Williams, No. CV07-00129, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42980, at *5 (D. Ariz.
June 12, 2007) (applying Twombly and refusing to dismiss plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim
since plaintiffs “satisfied these minimum pleading requirements”).
205. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (invoking
Twombly to dismiss complaint in eminent domain case, explaining that “Plaintiffs have not
set forth facts supporting a plausible claim of an unconstitutional taking”); Aktieselskabet
AF 21 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. June 7, 2007) (referencing Twombly
to dismiss patent litigation complaint “support[ed] . . . only with conclusory assertions,”
which the court considered analogous to Twombly’s mere parallel-conduct allegations).
206. No. 07–1015 U.S. 1 (May 18, 2009).
207. Id. at 10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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But if Twombly did not affect Rule 8’s pleading standard, why did
the Court see fit to accept review, this time dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint rather than sustaining it as had occurred in Conley, Leatherman,
and Swierkiewicz? Was it merely “to address the proper standard for
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct . . . .”?208 Or might a more looming issue have also affected the
Court, one that dovetailed conveniently into its articulated issue?
Recall the atmosphere that preceded Conley, Leatherman, and
Swierkiewicz. Despite contrary congressional and Supreme Court mandates, lower courts had continued to elevate Rule 8’s pleading standard. Each time these unauthorized efforts reached a critical point
and the Court was presented with an opportunity to correct things,
the Court did so by entering the fray and sounding a seemingly enduring call to lower courts to refrain from improperly changing the law.
Not unlike the atmosphere that preceded Conley, Leatherman, and
Swierkiewicz (and in keeping with the reality that history has a way of
re-re-repeating itself), the Twombly Court seemed mindful that “federal courts [were] continu[ing] to require heightened pleading in a
variety of contexts,”209 despite the Court’s constant and contrary
admonitions:
Despite strong words from the Supreme Court expressing its continued commitment to this rubric, heightened pleading thrives
post-Leatherman. Courts cling to it in civil rights cases. Congress imposes it with the PSLRA210 and the Y2K Act.211 Both ignore the
208. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
209. Elizabeth Roseman, Comment, A Phoenix from the Ashes? Heightened Pleading Requirements in Disparate Impact Cases, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2006); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1064 (2003) (“A uniform
pleading standard with notice as the touchstone remains illusory. Yet the intentions of the
drafters are clear. . . . [T]he Supreme Court reinforces notice pleading as the only
choice.”).
210. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 37 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z–1 and § 78u-4 (2006)). The PSLRA imposes heightened pleading requirements in actions brought pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the securities laws
and “insists that securities fraud complaints ‘specify’ each misleading statement; that they
set forth the facts ‘on which [a] belief’ that a statement is misleading was ‘formed’; and
that they ‘state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.’” Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81–82 (2006)
(quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005)).
211. Pub. L. No. 106–37, 113 State. 185 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601–6617
(2006)).
The Y2K Act requires that the complaint contain “specific information as to the
nature and amount of each element of damages and the factual basis for the
damages calculation.” The purpose of this and other related provisions is to provide for an early detailed disclosure of the plaintiffs’ claims to allow quick informal resolution by the parties, thereby avoiding costly litigation.
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drafters’ vision, with predictable consequences. The simple notice
pleading standard is replaced with an uncertain one. Uniform application of pleading practice is eroded by splits in the courts of
appeals applying heightened pleading. Transsubstantivity gives way
to different pleading standards for different substantive claims. In
essence, the result is common-law pleading revisited. The consequences are not surprising. Whole categories of cases are deemed
frivolous. Plaintiffs suffer prediscovery dismissal, often for failure to
plead facts relating to the defendant’s state of mind. The Court has
not once, but twice, tried to establish limits to heightened pleading
in civil rights cases. In this context, two rights don’t make a wrong.
However, given the post-Leatherman experience, it is unlikely that
those courts that embrace heightened pleading will abandon it on
the strength of Swierkiewicz.212

Given this defiant environment, it is not surprising that the Court
reinvolved itself in the pleading-standard discussion. But this time the
Court saw fit to dismiss rather than sustain the plaintiffs’ complaint
based on the complaint’s allegations, not on Rule 8 and its accompanying standard. After reaffirming Rule 8’s pleading standard, the Court
described its belief that the Twombly plaintiffs had failed to plead facts
sufficient to satisfy this enduring standard. As the Court expressed repeatedly (and reiterated in Erickson), it never intended to raise Rule
8’s longstanding requirements. The Court’s similar reaffirmations in
Conley, Leatherman, and Swierkiewicz resulted—on the facts of those
Medimatch, Inc. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 842, 849 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 6607(b) (2006)).
212. Fairman, supra note 6, at 625. The retention of heightened pleading postSwierkiewicz was most prevalent in the context of claims involving qualified immunity defenses. See, e.g., Passmore Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 838 (11th Cir.
2004) (explaining that the heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases applies to
defendants who claim qualified immunity); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th
Cir. 2003) (“In examining the factual allegations in the complaint, we must keep in mind
the heightened pleading requirements for civil rights cases, especially those involving the
defense of qualified immunity.”); Gorski v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 473 (1st Cir.
2002) (despite Swierkiewicz, First Circuit cases suggest heightened pleading in certain civil
rights cases); Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2002) (targeted heightened
pleading in Section 1983 prisoner litigation requiring the complaint to specifically allege
exhaustion of administrative remedies not affected by Swierkiewicz because standard derives
from the Prison Litigation Reform Act not the Federal Rules); Strope v. Pettis, No. 03-3383,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24332, at *17 (D. Kan. Nov. 23, 2004) (“Where a qualified immunity
defense is asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must apply a heightened pleading
standard . . . .”); see also Hamrick v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-4202, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7767, at *32 (D. Kan. 2004); Safford v. St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection
Dist. No. 1, No. 02-0055, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5111, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 2004); J.V. v.
Seminole County Sch. Bd., No. 6:04-CV-1889, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46474, at *9–10 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 2, 2005) (“Eleventh Circuit precedent makes clear that heightened pleading requirements apply in civil rights cases asserted against defendants who may avail themselves
of the defense of qualified immunity.”).
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cases—in orders sustaining the plaintiffs’ complaints because those
complaints were properly pleaded according to the prevailing and stillcurrent standard. Yet, the complaint in Twombly, when considered according to this same standard—a standard that was at all times available to plaintiffs—simply did not.
Considering the Twombly complaint against the example described in Form 9 only amplifies the Court’s declaration that it did not
adjust Rule 8’s pleading standard. Form 9 has always provided plaintiffs guidance because it considers a controversy that can just as easily
be attributed to negligence as not. As such, based on Form 9’s facts
the discovery process may properly commence, so the parties can
reach a just resolution on the merits. But the Twombly complaint
struck the Court as entirely conjectural (if not fabricated) in that no
facts demonstrating an illegal agreement appeared to exist. The plaintiffs had alleged an illegal agreement that caused them damage, but
they pleaded no facts (i.e., who, what, where, when, why) to support
this conclusion as demonstrated in Form 9 (i.e., who—defendant;
what—drove into plaintiff; where—Boylston Street; when—June 1,
1936; why—because defendant was negligent). Contrasting the
Twombly plaintiffs’ “factual” allegations with Form 9’s factual allegations further confirms the Court’s objective to remain true to Rule 8’s
longstanding ideals.
So the Court got it right when it said, “the complaint warranted
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to
relief plausible.”213 The majority believed, based on the notice the
plaintiffs provided, that proceeding to discovery or beyond would
have been both futile and unfair—circumstances that even Justice Stevens’ dissent admitted justify dismissal.214 In this manner, and on account of the Court’s reasoned interpretation of the complaint’s
factual allegations, Twombly did not change the pleading standard on
account of merely invoking the adjective “plausible” when describing
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. Rather, it reaffirmed this standard in
the face of lower courts’ continued and unjustified restriction of it
and did so while explaining this time that the complaint’s factual allegations failed to comply with the Court’s long-embraced standard.
As demonstrated then, Twombly marks no departure from Rule
8’s pleading standard. Rather, Twombly affirms it, simply re-expressing
213. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).
214. See id. at 577 (“Consistent with the design of the Federal Rules, Conley’s ‘no set of
facts’ formulation permits outright dismissal only when proceeding to discovery or beyond
would be futile.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that a complaint containing implausible (if not far-fetched or even
fabricated) allegations supported by no facts—such as solely parallel
conduct to plead antitrust-conspiracy allegations as opposed to conspiratorial facts subject to naturally differing inferences—requires dismissal. When considered this way, Twombly’s holding was not that
significant, after all.

Conclusion
Things are no different today than they were before Twombly, as
Twombly merely reaffirmed Rule 8’s liberal pleading standard. Because
the Court acted consistently with its multiple earlier efforts to educate
the bench and bar on proper pleading practice, Twombly cannot fairly
be understood to have enhanced Rule 8’s pleading standard. An honest reading of Twombly commands otherwise.
On account of Twombly, plaintiffs who plead—not prove—reasoned and believable fact-based complaints, as Rule 8 has always required, can reasonably expect courts to sustain them. Twombly merely
describes the Court’s latest foray into preventing lower courts from
wrongly adjusting Rule 8’s pleading standard in a way that many commentators, ironically, believe the Court itself did. As such, Twombly is
hardly the “big one” that these commentators insist.
Rather, life and litigation march on after Twombly, hopefully in
the manner that Judge Clark and the rest of Rule 8’s drafters intended. With Twombly, the Supreme Court did its job to ensure Rule
8’s proper application. Hopefully, the Court’s third time will prove a
charm, and lower courts will finally regard the Court’s instruction and
apply Rule 8 to plaintiffs’ complaints in the manner that the Rule’s
drafters originally and eternally envisioned.

